Abstract-Covert wireless communication can prevent an adversary from knowing the existence of user's transmission, thus provide stronger security protection. In AWGN channels, a square root law was obtained and the result shows that Alice can reliably and covertly transmit O( √ n) bits to Bob in n channel uses in the presence of a passive eavesdropper (Willie). However, existing work presupposes that Willie is static and only samples the channels at a fixed place. If Willie can dynamically adjust the testing distance between him and Alice according to his sampling values, his detection probability of error can be reduced significantly via a trend test. We found that, if Alice has no prior knowledge about Willie, she cannot hide her transmission behavior in the presence of an active Willie, and the square root law does not hold in this situation. We then proposed a novel countermeasure to deal with the active Willie. Through randomized transmission scheduling, Willie cannot detect Alice's transmission attempts if Alice can set her transmission probability below a threshold. Additionally, we systematically evaluated the security properties of covert communications in a dense wireless network, and proposed a density-based routing scheme to deal with multi-hop covert communication in a wireless network. As the network grows denser, Willie's uncertainty increases, and finally resulting in a "shadow" network to Willie.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless networks are changing the way we interact with the world around us. Billions of small and smart wireless nodes can communicate with each other and cooperate to fulfil sophisticated tasks. However, due to the inherent openness of wireless channels, the widespread of wireless networks and development of pervasive computing not only opens up exciting opportunities for economic growth, but also opens the door to a variety of new security threats.
Traditional network security methods based on cryptography can not solve all security problems. If a wireless node wishes to talk to other without being detected by an eavesdropper, encryption is not enough [1] . Even a message is encrypted, the pattern of network traffic can reveal some sensitive information. Additionally, if the adversary cannot ascertain Alice's transmission behavior, Alice's communication is unbreakable even if the adversary has unlimited computing and storage resources and can mount powerful quantum attacks [2] . On other occasions, users hope to protect their source location privacy [3] , they also need to prevent the adversary from detecting their transmission attempts.
Covert communication has a long history. It is always related with steganography [4] which conceals information in covertext objects, such as images or software binary code. While steganography requires some forms of content as cover, the network covert channel requires network protocols as carrier [5] [6] . Another kind of covert communication is spread spectrum [7] which is used to protect wireless communication from jamming and eavesdropping. In this paper, we consider another kind of physical-layer covert wireless communications that employs noise as the cover to hide user's transmission attempts.
Consider the scenario where Alice would like to talk to Bob over a wireless channel in order to not being detected by a warden Willie. Bash et al. found a square root law [8] in AWGN channels: Alice can only transmit O( √ n) bits reliably and covertly to Bob over n uses of wireless channels. If Willie does not know the time of transmission attempts of Alice, Alice can reliably transmit more bits to Bob with a slotted AWGN channel [9] . In practice, Willie has measurement uncertainty about its noise level due to the existence of SNR wall [10] , then Alice can achieve an asymptotic privacy rate which approaches a non-zero constant [11] [12] . In discrete memoryless channels (DMC), the privacy rate of covert communication is found to scale like the square root of the blocklength [13] . Bloch et al. [14] discussed the covert communication problem from a resolvability perspective, and developed an alternative coding scheme to achieve the covertness. In general, the covertness of communication is due to the existence of noise that Willie cannot accurately distinguish Alice's signal from the background noise. To improve the performance of covert communication, interference or jamming can be leveraged as a useful security tool [15] [16] [17] . In [18] , Sober et al. added a friendly "jammer" to wireless environment to help Alice for security objectives. Soltani et al. [19] [20] considered a network scenario where there are multiple "friendly" nodes that can generate jamming signals to hide the transmission attempts from multiple adversaries. Liu et al. [21] and He et al. [22] studied the covert wireless communication with the consideration of interference uncertainty. From the network perspective, the communications are hidden in the noisy wireless networks.
For the methods discussed above, the eavesdropper Willie is assumed to be passive and static, which means that Willie is placed in a fixed place, eavesdropping and judging Alice's behavior from his observations. However, an wireless networks, and propose a density-based routing (DBR) to deal with multi-hop covert communications. We find that, as the network becomes more and more denser and complicated, Willie's difficulty of detection is greatly increased, and nonuniform network is securer than a uniform network. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the system model, In Section III, we present the active Willie attack. The countermeasures to the active Willie are studied in Section IV, and the covert communication in a dense wireless network is discussed in Section V. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper and discusses possible future research directions.
II. SYSTEM MODEL

A. Channel Model
Consider a wireless communication scene where Alice (A) wishes to transmit messages to Bob (B). An eavesdropper, or a warden Willie (W) is eavesdropping over wireless channels and trying to find whether or not Alice is transmitting. We adopt the wireless channel model similar to [8] . Each node, legitimate node or eavesdropper, is equipped with a single omnidirectional antenna. All wireless channels are assumed to suffer from discrete-time AWGN with real-valued symbols, and the wireless channel is modeled by large-scale fading with path loss exponent α (α > 2).
Let the transmission power employed for Alice be P 0 , and s (A) be the real-valued symbol Alice transmitted which is a Gaussian random variable N (0, 1). The receiver Bob observes the signal 
and 
B. Active Willie
In [8] and [20] , the eavesdropper Willie is assumed to be passive and static, which means that Willie is placed in a fixed place, eavesdropping and judging Alice's behavior from his samples y
), Willie makes a decision on whether the received signal is noise or Alice's signal plus noise. Willie employs a radiometer as his detector, and does the following statistic test
where γ denotes Willie's detection threshold and n is the number of samples. The system framework with an active Willie is depicted in Fig. 1 . Willie can move to several places to gather more samples for further detection.
In the Fig. 1 , Willie detects Alice's behavior at 2t different locations (each location is d meters apart). At each location he gathers m samples. For example, at t-th location, Willie's samples can be presented as a vector where each sample y
. The average signal power at t-th location can be calculated as follows
Therefore Willie will have a signal power vector T, consisting of 2t values at different locations
Then Willie decides whether (T (y 1 ), T (y 2 ), · · · , T (y 2t )) has a downward trend or not any trend. If the trend analysis shows a downward trend for given significance level β, Willie can ascertain that Alice is transmitting with probability 1 − β.
C. Hypothesis Testing
To find whether Alice is transmitting or not, Willie has to distinguish between the following two hypotheses, H 0 : there is not any trend in vector T;
there is a downward trend in vector T. (10)
Given the vector T, Willie can leverage the Cox-Stuart test [23] to detect the presence of trend. The idea of the Cox-Stuart test is based on the comparison of the first and the second half of the samples. If there is a downward trend, the observations in the second half of the samples should be smaller than in the first half. If they are greater, the presence of an upward trend is suspected. If there is not any trend one should expect only small differences between the first and the second half of the samples due to randomness. Alice's signal
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Signal power at t-th location T Signal power vector λ Density of the network
Chi-square distribution with m degrees of freedom (at t-th location)
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Test statistic of the Cox-Stuart test β
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The Cox-Stuart test is a sign test applied to the sample of non-zero differences. To perform a trend analysis on T, the sample of differences is to be calculated as follows
Let sgn(∆ i ) = 1 for ∆ i < 0, and suppose the sample of negative differences by ∆ 1 , ∆ 2 , ..., ∆ k , then the test statistic of the Cox-Stuart test on the vector T is
Given a significance level β and the binomial distribution b ∼ b(t, 0.5), we can reject the hypothesis H 0 and accept the alternative hypothesis H 1 if T ∆<0 < b(β) which means a downward trend is found with probability larger than 1 − β, where b(β) is the quantile of the binomial distribution b. According to the central limit theorem, if t is large enough
] can be applied, where Φ −1 (β) is the β-quantile function of the standard normal distribution. Therefore, if
Willie can ascertain that Alice is transmitting with probability larger than 1 − β for the significance level β of test. The parameters and notation used in this paper are illustrated in Table I . 
III. ACTIVE WILLIE ATTACK
This section discusses the covert wireless communication in the presence of active Willie. Bash et al. found a square root law in AWGN channels [8] , which implies that Alice can transmit O( √ n) bits reliably and covertly over n uses of channels. However, if an active Willie is placed in the vicinity of Alice, Alice cannot conceal her transmitting behavior. Willie can detect Alice's transmission behavior with arbitrarily low probability of error. As illustrated in Fig. 1 , when Alice is transmitting, Willie detects Alice's behavior at 2t different locations. At each location he gathers m samples and calculates the signal power at this location. At t-th location (with the distance d t between Alice and Willie), Willie's samples are a vector
with y
) and the signal power at this location is
where
and χ 2 t (m) is the chi-squared distribution with m degrees of freedom. Fig. 2 shows examples of the signal power at different locations when Alice is transmitting or not. We can find that, even if the channel experiences fading, the downward trend of the signal power is obvious when Alice is transmitting.
Next we discuss the method that Willie utilizes to detect transmission attempts. With 2t values T (y i ) at different locations in his hand, Willie decides whether (T (y 1 ), T (y 2 ), · · · , T (y 2t )) has a downward trend or not. If Alice is transmitting, the probability that the difference ∆ i = T (y i ) − T (y t+i ) < 0 can be estimated as follows,
t+i . Given a random variable X and its PDF f X (x), its second moment can be bounded as
Because χ 
where F (m, m) is an F-distribution with two parameters m and m, and its mean and variance are
If Willie can gather enough samples at each location, i.e., m is large, according to (17) and (19), we have
Therefore the number of negative differences in ∆ 1 , ∆ 2 , ..., ∆ t can be estimated as follows
where 1 {∆i<0} is an indicator function, 1 {∆i<0} = 1 when ∆ i < 0; otherwise 1 {∆i<0} = 0. According to the setting, we have
As to
and
Since P t = 2 α P 2t and P 2t ≥ σ 2 0 ,
According to Equ. (20) , the negative differences have
If t is large enough, the following inequality holds
Therefore, given any small significance level β > 0, if the number of differences t satisfies
Willie can distinguish between two hypotheses H 0 and H 1 with probability 1 − β. Fig. 3 shows the significance level β versus t for different path loss exponent. Less significance level β, more sampling locations Willie should take to distinguish two hypotheses. If Alice is transmitting, Willie can ascertain that Alice is transmitting with probability 1 − β for any small β. This may be a pessimistic result since it demonstrates that Alice cannot resist the attack of active Willie and the square root law [8] does not hold in this situation. If Willie can move to the vicinity of Alice and have enough sampling locations, Alice is no longer able to hide her transmission attempts. 
IV. COUNTERMEASURES TO ACTIVE WILLIE
The previous discussion shows that, Alice cannot hide her transmission behavior in the presence of an active Willie, even if she can utilize other transmitters (or jammers) to increase the interference level of Willie, such as the methods used in [18] [19] [20] [21] . These methods can only raise the noise level but not change the trend of the sampling value. Next we discuss two methods that can increase the detection difficulty of the active Willie.
A. Dynamic power adjustment
If Alice has information about Willie, such as Willie's location, the simplest way she can take is decreasing her transmission power when she finds out that Willie is in her close proximity. When Willie is very close, Alice simply stops transmitting and keeps quiet until Willie leaves.
However, Alice may be a small and simple IoT device who is not able to perceive the environmental information, let alone knowing Willie's location. As to the active Willie, he is a passive eavesdropper who does not interact with any of the parties involved, attempting to determine the transmission party. Therefore Willie cannot be easily detected.
In practice, Alice can dynamically adjust her transmission power to make the decreasing tendency of her signal power T (Y) unclear to Willie's detector. As depicted in Fig. 4 , Alice chooses the maximum transmission power p max = 36dB and the minimum transmission power p min = 20dB, and at first transmits at the maximum transmission power, then decreases ∆ = 0.8dB at each location. From the figure we find, if Alice transmits with decreasing power and Willie approaches Alice to take further samples, the signal power of Willie's detector has a weaker growth trend than the constant transmission power Alice employed. When Willie is far away from Alice, the signal power Willie sees has no certain trend, just like the background noise. Only when Willie approaches Alice, a growth trend gradually increases and could be detected easily.
This approach can only be used in the occasion that Willie cannot sneak up on Alice very closely. Besides, if Willie gradually moves away from Alice and gathers the signal power in this procedure, he will see a significant downward trend in his signal power, resulting in the exposure of Alice's transmission behavior.
B. Randomized transmission scheduling
In practice, to confuse Willie, Alice's transmitted signal should resemble white noise. Alice should not generate burst traffic, but transforming a bulk message into a slow network traffic with transmission and silence alternatively. She can divide the time into slots, then put the message into small packets. After that, Alice sends a packet in a time slot with a transmission probability p, or keeps silence with the probability 1 − p, and so on. Fig. 5 illustrates the examples of Willie's sampling signal power T (y 1 ), · · · , T (y 2t ) in the case that Alice's transmission probability p is set to 0.1, 0.5, and 0.9. Clearly, when Alice's transmission probability p decreases, the downward tendency of the signal power is lessening, Willie's uncertainty increases.
Next we evaluate the effect of the transmission probability on the covertness of communications. Suppose Alice divides the time into slots, and transmits at a slot with the transmission probability p. As to Willie, for each time slot, he samples the channel m times at a fixed location, then at the next slot he moves to a closer location to sample the channel, and so on.
The signal power Willie obtained at i-th sampling location can be represented as follows
where X is a random variable, X = 1 if Alice is transmitting, X = 0 if Alice is silent, and the transmission probability P{X = 1} = p. Given the transmitting probability p, the probability that the difference ∆ i = T (y i ) − T (y t+i ) < 0 can be estimated as follows
, thus when p is small enough, we can approximate Equ. (30) as follows
and the test statistic of the Cox-Stuart test is
Therefore, for any small significance value β, Alice can find a proper transmission probability p which satisfies
This means that, when the transmission probability p is set to
then Willie cannot detect Alice's transmission behavior for a certain significance value β. Fig. 6 depicts the significance level β versus the transmission probability p for different parameter t in the CoxStuart test. Larger significance level β will result in lower transmission probability p, and more differences in trend test t will increase Willie's detecting ability, which implies that Alice should decrease her transmission probability.
The randomized transmission scheduling is a practical way for Alice to decrease the probability of being detected. Although it may increases the transmission latency, Willie's uncertainty increases as well. 
V. COVERT WIRELESS COMMUNICATION IN DENSE NETWORKS
In practice, to detect the transmission attempt of Alice, Willie should approach Alice as close as possible, and ensure that there is no other node located closer to Alice than him. Otherwise, Willie cannot determine which one is the actual transmitter.
In a dense wireless network, Bob and Willie not only experience noise, but also interference from other transmitters simultaneously. In this scenario, it is difficult for Willie to detect a certain transmitter tangibly. Fig. 7 illustrates the dilemma Wille faced in covert wireless communication with multiple potential transmitters. As shown in Fig. 7(a) and (b), if Willie (W) finds his observations look suspicious, he knows for certain that some nodes are transmitting, but he cannot determine whether Alice (A) or Bob (B) is transmitting. Even in the case of Fig. 7 (c) , Willie cannot determine with confidence that Alice (A), not Bob (B) is transmitting, since the received signal strength of Willie is determined by the randomness of Alice's signal and the fading of wireless channels. Therefore it is difficult to be predicted.
For a static and passive Willie, to discriminate the actual transmitter from the other is an almost impossible task, provided that there is no obvious radio fingerprinting of transmitters can be exploited [24] . And what's worse is, Willie will be bewildered by a dense wireless network with a large number of nodes. As depicted in Fig. 8 (a) a upward trend in his samples via Cox-Stuart test, he could ascertain that A is transmitting. If a weak downward trend can be found, Wille can be sure that A is not a transmitter, but C's suspicion increases. Willie may move along the direction c to carry out more accurate testing. If a upward trend is found, then C may be the transmitter. However, if there is no trend found, the transmitters may be B or D. Then Willie could move along direction b or d to find the actual signal source. This is a slight simplification, and more complicated scenarios are possible. In the case depicted in Fig. 8 (b) , Willie should move along all four directions, sampling, and testing the existence of any trend to distinguish Alice among her many neighbors, potential transmitters. In a dense wireless network Willie cannot always be able to find out who is transmitting. As depicted in Fig. 9 , the gray area is the detection region of Willie where there is no other potential transmitters and d max is the maximum distance that can be used by Willie to take his trend statistical test. However Willie cannot get too close to Alice, d 0 is the minimum distance between them. In a wireless network, some wireless nodes are probably placed on towers, trees, or buildings, Willie cannot get close enough as he wishes. If Willie leverages the Cox-Stuart trend test to detect Alice's transmission behavior, the following conditions should be satisfied:
• No other node in the detection region of Willie.
• In the detection region, Willie should have enough space for testing, i.e., Willie can take as many sampling points as possible, and the spacing of points is not too small. As illustrated in Fig. 10 , if Willie can only get samples in the distance interval (d 0 , d max ) = (2.5, 5)m, it is difficult to discover a downward trend in the signal power vector he obtains in a short testing interval.
Suppose d A,W be the distance between Alice and Willie, then the probability that there is no nodes inside the disk region with Alice as the centre and d A,W as a radius can be estimated as follows
where λ is the density of the network. Let P{N = 0} > 1 − ǫ for small ǫ > 0, we have
In a random graph G(n, p), if c = pn > 1, then the largest component of G(n, p) has Θ(n) vertices, and the secondlargest component has at most 
then if the density of the wireless network satisfies the following condition
the wireless network will become a shadow network to Willie since nodes are so close that he cannot distinguish between them in a very narrow space.
As illustrated in Fig. 11 (a) and (d), as the density increases, more nodes are close to each other and the connected clusters (with d max = 5m) become more larger. In any connected cluster, Willie is not able to distinguish any transmitter in it due to the lack of detection space. However if the density is not enough, there is unconnected nodes and small clusters in the network . If we want to establish a multi-hop links to transmit a covert message, the best way is avoiding the sparse part of the network and let network traffics flow into the denser part of network. Based on this idea, we next propose a density-based routing algorithm to enhance the covertness of multi-hop routing.
Density-Based Routing (DBR): DBR is designed based on the basic idea: if we can choose the relay nodes with more neighbors, Willie will confront greater challenges to distinguish Alice from more potential transmitters. As depicted in Fig. 12 , Alice selects a routing path to the destination through denser node groups to avoid being found by active Willie.
DBR is a 2-stage routing protocol which can find routes from multiple sources to a single destination, a base station (BS). In the first stage, BS requests data by broadcasting a beacon. The beacon diffuses through the network hop-by-hop, and is broadcasted by each node to its neighbors only once. Each node that receives the beacon setups a backward path toward the node from which it receives the beacon. In the second stage, a node i that has information to send to BS searches its cache for a neighboring node to relay the message. The local rule is that, among the neighboring nodes who have broadcasted a beacon to node i, the node who has a larger number of neighbors will be selected with a higher probability. Then node i sends the message to the selected relay node j applied the randomized transmission scheduling. Furthermore, larger transmission probability will be applied when node i has more neighbors. Again node j does the same task as node i until the message reaches BS. Algorithm 1 shows the detailed description of DBR in node i.
Algorithm 1 Density-Based Routing (Node i)
Input: The set of neighbors of node i: N i = {i 1 , i 2 , ..., i k } (i k is the locally unique identifier of node), the number of neighbors of nodes in set
the average number of neighbors of nodes in the whole network deg, and the upper bound of default transmission probability 0 < p max < 1.
Output: The relay node c k ∈ N i and the transmission probability p i of node i.
Initialization: The set of candidate relay nodes R i = {}. Stage 1: Beacon Broadcasting: 1) When the node i receives a beacon broadcasting by its neighbors, it checks to see if this beacon is rebroadcasted by itself. If not, the node broadcasts the beacon to its neighbors. 2) Once receiving a beacon broadcasted by its neighbor i k , node i puts i k into the set of candidate relay nodes R i . Stage 2: Relay Selection:
Node generates a random number r 0 between 0 and 1. If the random number is
then the node c 1 becomes the relay node; Otherwise, if k > 1 and then the node c k becomes the relay node. 2) Node i chooses his transmission probability as follows
where x i = deg(i) − deg. Fig. 11 illustrates examples of density-based routing when the network is uniform or nonuniform. Fig. 13 depicts the ratio of secure relays versus the density of network for different routing schemes. Two routing schemes, DBR and GBR (Gradient-Based Routing [26] ), are compared. We can find that more dense a network is, the relays are more secure, that is, the transmitters are hidden in a noisy network, not easily be detected by Willie. Besides, DBR has a better security performance than the GBR (Gradient-Based Routing). Furthermore, a nonuniform network is more secure than a uniform network, since a nonuniform network has more dense clusters that the Fig. 13 . The ratio of secure relays versus the density of network for different routing schemes. The network configuration is illustrated in Fig. 11 . GBR is the gradient-based routing [26] .
active Willie cannot distinguish any transmitter (hidden in it) from more other potential transmitters. DBR is a simple routing protocol in which each node does not need sophisticated operations, such as measuring the distance between it and its neighbors. This is reasonable since the node in an IoT network may be a very simple node. However, if the node has the knowledge of the distance to his neighbors, the security performance may be improved.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have demonstrated that the active Willie is hard to be defeated to achieve covertness of communications. If Alice has no prior knowledge about Willie, she cannot hide her transmission behavior in the presence of an active Willie, and the square root law is invalid in this situation. We then propose a countermeasure to deal with the active Willie. If Alice's transmission probability is set below a threshold, Willie cannot detect Alice's transmission behavior for a certain significance value. We further study the covert communication in dense wireless networks, and propose a density-based routing scheme to deal with multi-hop covert communications. We find that, as the network becomes more and more dense and complicated, Willie's difficulty of detection is greatly increased. What Willie sees may become a "shadow" network.
As a first step of studying the effects of active Willie on covert wireless communication, this work considers a simple scenario with one active Willie only. A natural future work is to extend the study to multi-Willie. They may work in coordination to enhance their detection ability, and may launch other sophisticated attacks. Another relative aspect is how to extend the results to MIMO channels. Perhaps the most difficult challenge is how to cope with a powerful active Willie equipped with more antennas than Alice and Bob have.
